[REQ-END-097] Configure User Rights: Access this computer from the network

Target Scope

  • Applicable Systems: Tier 2 client workstations and member servers. (For Tier 0 Privileged Access Workstations, refer to tightened baseline REQ-PAW-093). (For Domain Controllers, refer to REQ-DC-104).
  • Operating Systems: Windows 10 Enterprise/Professional (1809 and above), Windows 11 Enterprise/Pro, Windows Server 2016, 2019, 2022, and 2025.

Implementation Details

  • Priority: High
  • GPO Path / Registry Location:
    • Policy Display Name: Access this computer from the network
    • Privilege Constant: SeNetworkLogonRight
    • GPO Path: Computer Configuration\Policies\Windows Settings\Security Settings\Local Policies\User Rights Assignment\Access this computer from the network
    • Registry Location: Stored inside local security database under privilege SeNetworkLogonRight set to *S-1-5-32-544 (Administrators), *S-1-5-32-555 (Remote Desktop Users).

Rationale

The SeNetworkLogonRight determines which security principals are permitted to authenticate and establish network logon sessions (Logon Type 3) across the network over protocols like SMB, RPC, WMI, WinRM, and LDAP. Network logons authenticate users without creating an interactive desktop shell, enabling file share access, remote management, and inter-system synchronization.

1. Technical Threat Vector & Abuse Mechanics

Allowing broad network logon rights opens the system to unauthorized remote inspection, password spraying, and lateral movement: (1) On PAWs: Privileged Access Workstations must be isolated clean sources. Allowing incoming network connections permits an attacker to connect to a PAW over SMB or RPC, scan for listening services, and attempt credential relaying. PAWs must restrict network logon strictly to Administrators (S-1-5-32-544); (2) On Domain Controllers: Network logons must allow domain communication for Enterprise Domain Controllers (S-1-5-9) and Authenticated Users (S-1-5-11), while excluding untrusted and anonymous callers; (3) On Endpoints: Workstations should permit network logons to Administrators and Authenticated Users while denying local accounts via deny rules.

2. Architectural Defense & Least Privilege Enforcement

On general workstations and member servers, enforcing least privilege for this user right is critical for host isolation. Preventing unprivileged users or rogue applications from exercising this right stops local privilege escalation (LPE) and blocks adversaries from leveraging co-located user sessions to harvest credentials or pivot across the corporate subnet.

On PAWs, configure strictly to Administrators (S-1-5-32-544). On Domain Controllers, configure to Administrators (S-1-5-32-544), Authenticated Users (S-1-5-11), and Enterprise Domain Controllers (S-1-5-9). On Endpoints, configure to Administrators (S-1-5-32-544) and Authenticated Users (S-1-5-11). Untrusted groups like Everyone or Guests must never be granted network access.

3. MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

  • T1021.002 - Remote Services: SMB/Windows Admin Shares
  • T1021.006 - Remote Services: Windows Remote Management
  • T1078.002 - Valid Accounts: Domain Accounts
  • T1078.003 - Valid Accounts: Local Accounts

Legacy Impact & Compatibility

  • Operational Impact: Enforcing proper network logon boundaries isolates administrative workstations while enabling essential domain authentication. Restricting PAWs to Administrators blocks unauthenticated or non-admin network probes. Network logons are audited under Security Event ID 4624 (Logon Type 3).

Implementation Steps

Option A: Group Policy Object (GPO) Configuration (Preferred)

  1. Open the Group Policy Management Console (gpmc.msc).
  2. Navigate to the targeted GPO linked to Tier 2 systems (e.g., GPO_Hardening_Endpoints).
  3. In the console tree, browse to: Computer Configuration\Policies\Windows Settings\Security Settings\Local Policies\User Rights Assignment
  4. Open the policy Access this computer from the network.
  5. Select the Define these policy settings check box.
  6. Configure the security principal allocation to: *S-1-5-32-544 (Administrators), *S-1-5-32-555 (Remote Desktop Users).
  7. Click Apply and OK.
  8. Apply and verify policy enforcement across target hosts using gpupdate /force and inspect with secedit /export /cfg C:\Windows\Temp\sec_audit.cfg.

Option B: PowerShell & Registry Configuration (Remediation / Non-GPO)

Download Script: Configure-UraSeNetworkLogonRight.ps1

# Configure-UraSeNetworkLogonRight.ps1
$SecTempDir = Join-Path $env:TEMP "SecurityTemplates"
if (-not (Test-Path $SecTempDir)) { New-Item -Path $SecTempDir -ItemType Directory -Force | Out-Null }
$CfgFile = Join-Path $SecTempDir "ura_senetworklogonright.cfg"
$DbFile = Join-Path $SecTempDir "secedit_senetworklogonright.sdb"
$LogFile = Join-Path $SecTempDir "secedit.log"

$Process = Start-Process secedit -ArgumentList "/export /cfg `"$CfgFile`"" -Wait -NoNewWindow -PassThru
if ($Process.ExitCode -ne 0) { Throw "Failed to export security template" }

$ConfigText = Get-Content -Path $CfgFile -Raw
if ($ConfigText -notmatch "\[Privilege Rights\]") {
    $ConfigText += "`r`n[Privilege Rights]`r`n"
}

$Lines = $ConfigText -split "`r?`n"
$NewLines = @()
$InPriv = $false
$KeyAdded = $false

foreach ($Line in $Lines) {
    if ($Line -match "^\[(.*)\]$") {
        if ($Matches[1] -eq "Privilege Rights") {
            $InPriv = $true
        } else {
            $InPriv = $false
        }
    }
    if ($InPriv -and $Line -match "^\s*SeNetworkLogonRight\s*=") {
        $NewLines += "SeNetworkLogonRight = *S-1-5-32-544,*S-1-5-32-555"
        $KeyAdded = $true
    } else {
        $NewLines += $Line
    }
}

if (-not $KeyAdded) {
    # Find Privilege Rights section index and insert it right after
    $Idx = $NewLines.IndexOf("[Privilege Rights]")
    if ($Idx -ge 0) {
        $NewLines.Insert($Idx + 1, "SeNetworkLogonRight = *S-1-5-32-544,*S-1-5-32-555")
    } else {
        $NewLines += "SeNetworkLogonRight = *S-1-5-32-544,*S-1-5-32-555"
    }
}

$NewLines | Set-Content -Path $CfgFile -Force
$Proc = Start-Process secedit -ArgumentList "/configure /db `"$DbFile`" /cfg `"$CfgFile`" /areas USER_RIGHTS /log `"$LogFile`"" -Wait -NoNewWindow -PassThru
if ($Proc.ExitCode -ne 0) { Throw "Failed to configure secedit user rights" }
Remove-Item -Path $CfgFile, $DbFile -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue

To audit the hardening status: Download Script: Get-UraSeNetworkLogonRightStatus.ps1

# Get-UraSeNetworkLogonRightStatus.ps1
$SecTempDir = Join-Path $env:TEMP "SecurityTemplates"
if (-not (Test-Path $SecTempDir)) { New-Item -Path $SecTempDir -ItemType Directory -Force | Out-Null }
$CfgFile = Join-Path $SecTempDir "ura_audit_senetworklogonright.cfg"

$Process = Start-Process secedit -ArgumentList "/export /cfg `"$CfgFile`"" -Wait -NoNewWindow -PassThru
if ($Process.ExitCode -ne 0) {
    Write-Output "Non-Compliant"
    exit 1
}

$ConfigText = Get-Content -Path $CfgFile -Raw
Remove-Item -Path $CfgFile -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue

$Match = $ConfigText -match "(?mi)^\s*SeNetworkLogonRight\s*=\s*(.*)$"
$CurrentValue = ""
if ($Match) {
    $CurrentValue = $Matches[1].Trim()
}

$Expected = "*S-1-5-32-544,*S-1-5-32-555"
if ($CurrentValue -eq $Expected) {
    Write-Output "Compliant"
    exit 0
} else {
    Write-Output "Non-Compliant"
    exit 1
}

Sources & Compliance References

  • ANSSI Active Directory Hardening Guide: ANSSI Active Directory Hardening Guide: R29 (Logon Rights Assignment)
  • CIS Benchmark: 2.2.2 (L1) Ensure 'Access this computer from the network' is restricted per baseline
  • Microsoft Security Baseline: User Rights Configuration specifications
  • Microsoft Learn: User Rights Assignment Reference

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