[REQ-DC-129] Configure User Rights: Manage auditing and security log on Domain Controllers
Target Scope
- Applicable Systems: Domain Controllers (Tier 0 Active Directory infrastructure). (For Tier 0 Privileged Access Workstations, refer to tightened baseline REQ-PAW-107). (For Tier 2 Client Workstations and Member Servers, refer to standard baseline REQ-END-115).
- Operating Systems: Windows Server 2016, Windows Server 2019, Windows Server 2022, and Windows Server 2025.
Implementation Details
- Priority: High
- GPO Path / Registry Location:
- Policy Display Name:
Manage auditing and security log - Privilege Constant:
SeSecurityPrivilege - GPO Path:
Computer Configuration\Policies\Windows Settings\Security Settings\Local Policies\User Rights Assignment\Manage auditing and security log - Registry Location: Stored inside local security database under privilege
SeSecurityPrivilegeset to*S-1-5-32-544 (Administrators).
- Policy Display Name:
Rationale
The SeSecurityPrivilege controls access to the Windows Security Event Log (Security.evtx) and governs the ability to view, configure, and clear the security log, as well as specify object auditing options (System Access Control Lists - SACLs) on files, registry keys, and directory objects via ACCESS_SYSTEM_SECURITY.
1. Technical Threat Vector & Abuse Mechanics
An adversary holding SeSecurityPrivilege can blind security operations and erase digital forensic evidence: (1) Log Cleansing: The attacker can invoke ClearEventLog or run wevtutil cl Security to erase all audit records, destroying evidence of privilege escalation, lateral movement, credential dumping, and payload execution; (2) SACL Manipulation: The attacker can strip SACLs from critical files, registry keys, or Active Directory objects, preventing the generation of security event logs when sensitive resources are accessed or modified; (3) Evasion: Bypassing object auditing allows stealthy tampering with protected directory service objects.
2. Architectural Defense & Least Privilege Enforcement
Domain Controllers are the root of trust for the entire Active Directory forest, storing the directory database (ntds.dit), Kerberos master keys (krbtgt), and password hashes for all enterprise identities. Unrestricted allocation of user rights on Domain Controllers introduces devastating forest-compromise risks. Enforcing strict assignment of this privilege ensures that directory synchronization, authentication packages, and system execution remain strictly bounded to authorized directory components and Domain Administrators.
This privilege must be restricted exclusively to Administrators (S-1-5-32-544). Standard domain users, helpdesk operators, and third-party monitoring agents must not hold SeSecurityPrivilege. Security event log forwarding should be configured using Windows Event Forwarding (WEF) running under dedicated network service accounts without granting log management rights.
3. MITRE ATT&CK Mapping
- T1070.001 - Indicator Removal: Clear Windows Event Logs
- T1562.002 - Impair Defenses: Disable Windows Event Logging
- T1222.001 - File and Directory Permissions Modification: Windows DACL
Legacy Impact & Compatibility
- Operational Impact: Restricting
SeSecurityPrivilegetoAdministratorsprotects the integrity of security audit logs. Centralized SIEM forwarders (e.g., Splunk, Microsoft Sentinel, Elastic Agent) that run as dedicated service accounts should be configured to read event logs via membership in theEvent Log Readersbuilt-in group rather than holdingSeSecurityPrivilege. Log clearing events generate critical Security Event ID 1102 ('The audit log was cleared').
Implementation Steps
Option A: Group Policy Object (GPO) Configuration (Preferred)
- Open the Group Policy Management Console (
gpmc.msc). - Navigate to the targeted GPO linked to Tier 0 Domain Controller systems (e.g.,
Default Domain Controllers Policy). - In the console tree, browse to:
Computer Configuration\Policies\Windows Settings\Security Settings\Local Policies\User Rights Assignment - Open the policy
Manage auditing and security log. - Select the Define these policy settings check box.
- Configure the security principal allocation to:
*S-1-5-32-544 (Administrators). - Click Apply and OK.
- Apply and verify policy enforcement across target hosts using
gpupdate /forceand inspect withsecedit /export /cfg C:\Windows\Temp\sec_audit.cfg.
Option B: PowerShell & Registry Configuration (Remediation / Non-GPO)
Download Script: Configure-DcUraSeSecurityPrivilege.ps1
# Configure-DcUraSeSecurityPrivilege.ps1
# Configure-DcUraSeSecurityPrivilege.ps1
$SecTempDir = Join-Path $env:TEMP "SecurityTemplates"
if (-not (Test-Path $SecTempDir)) { New-Item -Path $SecTempDir -ItemType Directory -Force | Out-Null }
$CfgFile = Join-Path $SecTempDir "ura_sesecurityprivilege.cfg"
$DbFile = Join-Path $SecTempDir "secedit_sesecurityprivilege.sdb"
$LogFile = Join-Path $SecTempDir "secedit.log"
$Process = Start-Process secedit -ArgumentList "/export /cfg `"$CfgFile`"" -Wait -NoNewWindow -PassThru
if ($Process.ExitCode -ne 0) { Throw "Failed to export security template" }
$ConfigText = Get-Content -Path $CfgFile -Raw
if ($ConfigText -notmatch "\[Privilege Rights\]") {
$ConfigText += "`r`n[Privilege Rights]`r`n"
}
$Lines = $ConfigText -split "`r?`n"
$NewLines = @()
$InPriv = $false
$KeyAdded = $false
foreach ($Line in $Lines) {
if ($Line -match "^\[(.*)\]$") {
if ($Matches[1] -eq "Privilege Rights") {
$InPriv = $true
} else {
$InPriv = $false
}
}
if ($InPriv -and $Line -match "^\s*SeSecurityPrivilege\s*=") {
$NewLines += "SeSecurityPrivilege = *S-1-5-32-544"
$KeyAdded = $true
} else {
$NewLines += $Line
}
}
if (-not $KeyAdded) {
# Find Privilege Rights section index and insert it right after
$Idx = $NewLines.IndexOf("[Privilege Rights]")
if ($Idx -ge 0) {
$NewLines.Insert($Idx + 1, "SeSecurityPrivilege = *S-1-5-32-544")
} else {
$NewLines += "SeSecurityPrivilege = *S-1-5-32-544"
}
}
$NewLines | Set-Content -Path $CfgFile -Force
$Proc = Start-Process secedit -ArgumentList "/configure /db `"$DbFile`" /cfg `"$CfgFile`" /areas USER_RIGHTS /log `"$LogFile`"" -Wait -NoNewWindow -PassThru
if ($Proc.ExitCode -ne 0) { Throw "Failed to configure secedit user rights" }
Remove-Item -Path $CfgFile, $DbFile -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
To audit the hardening status: Download Script: Get-DcUraSeSecurityPrivilegeStatus.ps1
# Get-DcUraSeSecurityPrivilegeStatus.ps1
# Get-DcUraSeSecurityPrivilegeStatus.ps1
$SecTempDir = Join-Path $env:TEMP "SecurityTemplates"
if (-not (Test-Path $SecTempDir)) { New-Item -Path $SecTempDir -ItemType Directory -Force | Out-Null }
$CfgFile = Join-Path $SecTempDir "ura_audit_sesecurityprivilege.cfg"
$Process = Start-Process secedit -ArgumentList "/export /cfg `"$CfgFile`"" -Wait -NoNewWindow -PassThru
if ($Process.ExitCode -ne 0) {
Write-Output "Non-Compliant"
exit 1
}
$ConfigText = Get-Content -Path $CfgFile -Raw
Remove-Item -Path $CfgFile -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
$Match = $ConfigText -match "(?mi)^\s*SeSecurityPrivilege\s*=\s*(.*)$"
$CurrentValue = ""
if ($Match) {
$CurrentValue = $Matches[1].Trim()
}
$Expected = "*S-1-5-32-544"
if ($CurrentValue -eq $Expected) {
Write-Output "Compliant"
exit 0
} else {
Write-Output "Non-Compliant"
exit 1
}
Sources & Compliance References
- ANSSI Active Directory Hardening Guide: ANSSI Active Directory Hardening Guide: R28 (User Rights Assignment)
- CIS Benchmark: 2.2.31 (L1) Ensure 'Manage auditing and security log' is set to 'Administrators'
- Microsoft Security Baseline: User Rights Configuration specifications
- Microsoft Learn: User Rights Assignment Reference