[REQ-DC-115] Configure User Rights: Create permanent shared objects on Domain Controllers

Target Scope

  • Applicable Systems: Domain Controllers (Tier 0 Active Directory infrastructure). (For Tier 0 Privileged Access Workstations, refer to tightened baseline REQ-PAW-100). (For Tier 2 Client Workstations and Member Servers, refer to standard baseline REQ-END-106).
  • Operating Systems: Windows Server 2016, Windows Server 2019, Windows Server 2022, and Windows Server 2025.

Implementation Details

  • Priority: Medium
  • GPO Path / Registry Location:
    • Policy Display Name: Create permanent shared objects
    • Privilege Constant: SeCreatePermanentPrivilege
    • GPO Path: Computer Configuration\Policies\Windows Settings\Security Settings\Local Policies\User Rights Assignment\Create permanent shared objects
    • Registry Location: Stored inside local security database under privilege SeCreatePermanentPrivilege set to No one (Empty).

Rationale

The SeCreatePermanentPrivilege allows a process to create permanent object directory objects in the Windows Object Manager namespace (\DirectoryObject) via APIs like NtCreateDirectoryObject. Unlike standard kernel objects which are automatically destroyed when their last handle is closed, permanent objects persist in the object manager namespace across process terminations until explicitly unlinked or until system reboot.

1. Technical Threat Vector & Abuse Mechanics

Adversaries can exploit SeCreatePermanentPrivilege to achieve stealthy persistence, object squatting, and driver manipulation. By inserting permanent directory entries into system namespaces (such as \KnownDlls, \Device, or \Driver), an attacker can divert DLL resolution paths, hijack device object handles, or trick kernel components into interacting with rogue objects. This privilege provides ring-3 processes with an avenue to tamper with kernel-level object lifecycle management.

2. Architectural Defense & Least Privilege Enforcement

Domain Controllers are the root of trust for the entire Active Directory forest, storing the directory database (ntds.dit), Kerberos master keys (krbtgt), and password hashes for all enterprise identities. Unrestricted allocation of user rights on Domain Controllers introduces devastating forest-compromise risks. Enforcing strict assignment of this privilege ensures that directory synchronization, authentication packages, and system execution remain strictly bounded to authorized directory components and Domain Administrators.

Under rigorous security baselines, SeCreatePermanentPrivilege must be set to No one (Empty). No user account, administrative identity, or standard service principal requires this privilege in modern Windows environments. Ensuring this privilege is unassigned eliminates permanent object creation risks across the entire fleet.

3. MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

  • T1574.001 - Hijack Execution Flow: DLL Search Order Hijacking
  • T1543 - Create or Modify System Process
  • T1068 - Exploitation for Privilege Escalation

Legacy Impact & Compatibility

  • Operational Impact: Setting SeCreatePermanentPrivilege to No one aligns with Microsoft Security Baseline and CIS Benchmarks and introduces no operational degradation. Operating system components that manage permanent objects operate at kernel level and do not depend on user-level privilege assignments. Any attempt to assign or use this privilege triggers Security Event ID 4704 and Event ID 4673.

Implementation Steps

Option A: Group Policy Object (GPO) Configuration (Preferred)

  1. Open the Group Policy Management Console (gpmc.msc).
  2. Navigate to the targeted GPO linked to Tier 0 Domain Controller systems (e.g., Default Domain Controllers Policy).
  3. In the console tree, browse to: Computer Configuration\Policies\Windows Settings\Security Settings\Local Policies\User Rights Assignment
  4. Open the policy Create permanent shared objects.
  5. Select the Define these policy settings check box.
  6. Click Add User or Group... and ensure the principal list is empty (or remove all assigned accounts/groups so that no principals are configured).
  7. Click Apply and OK.
  8. Apply and verify policy enforcement across target hosts using gpupdate /force and inspect with secedit /export /cfg C:\Windows\Temp\sec_audit.cfg.

Option B: PowerShell & Registry Configuration (Remediation / Non-GPO)

Download Script: Configure-DcUraSeCreatePermanentPrivilege.ps1

# Configure-DcUraSeCreatePermanentPrivilege.ps1
# Configure-DcUraSeCreatePermanentPrivilege.ps1
$SecTempDir = Join-Path $env:TEMP "SecurityTemplates"
if (-not (Test-Path $SecTempDir)) { New-Item -Path $SecTempDir -ItemType Directory -Force | Out-Null }
$CfgFile = Join-Path $SecTempDir "ura_secreatepermanentprivilege.cfg"
$DbFile = Join-Path $SecTempDir "secedit_secreatepermanentprivilege.sdb"
$LogFile = Join-Path $SecTempDir "secedit.log"

$Process = Start-Process secedit -ArgumentList "/export /cfg `"$CfgFile`"" -Wait -NoNewWindow -PassThru
if ($Process.ExitCode -ne 0) { Throw "Failed to export security template" }

$ConfigText = Get-Content -Path $CfgFile -Raw
if ($ConfigText -notmatch "\[Privilege Rights\]") {
    $ConfigText += "`r`n[Privilege Rights]`r`n"
}

$Lines = $ConfigText -split "`r?`n"
$NewLines = @()
$InPriv = $false
$KeyAdded = $false

foreach ($Line in $Lines) {
    if ($Line -match "^\[(.*)\]$") {
        if ($Matches[1] -eq "Privilege Rights") {
            $InPriv = $true
        } else {
            $InPriv = $false
        }
    }
    if ($InPriv -and $Line -match "^\s*SeCreatePermanentPrivilege\s*=") {
        $NewLines += "SeCreatePermanentPrivilege = "
        $KeyAdded = $true
    } else {
        $NewLines += $Line
    }
}

if (-not $KeyAdded) {
    # Find Privilege Rights section index and insert it right after
    $Idx = $NewLines.IndexOf("[Privilege Rights]")
    if ($Idx -ge 0) {
        $NewLines.Insert($Idx + 1, "SeCreatePermanentPrivilege = ")
    } else {
        $NewLines += "SeCreatePermanentPrivilege = "
    }
}

$NewLines | Set-Content -Path $CfgFile -Force
$Proc = Start-Process secedit -ArgumentList "/configure /db `"$DbFile`" /cfg `"$CfgFile`" /areas USER_RIGHTS /log `"$LogFile`"" -Wait -NoNewWindow -PassThru
if ($Proc.ExitCode -ne 0) { Throw "Failed to configure secedit user rights" }
Remove-Item -Path $CfgFile, $DbFile -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue

To audit the hardening status: Download Script: Get-DcUraSeCreatePermanentPrivilegeStatus.ps1

# Get-DcUraSeCreatePermanentPrivilegeStatus.ps1
# Get-DcUraSeCreatePermanentPrivilegeStatus.ps1
$SecTempDir = Join-Path $env:TEMP "SecurityTemplates"
if (-not (Test-Path $SecTempDir)) { New-Item -Path $SecTempDir -ItemType Directory -Force | Out-Null }
$CfgFile = Join-Path $SecTempDir "ura_audit_secreatepermanentprivilege.cfg"

$Process = Start-Process secedit -ArgumentList "/export /cfg `"$CfgFile`"" -Wait -NoNewWindow -PassThru
if ($Process.ExitCode -ne 0) {
    Write-Output "Non-Compliant"
    exit 1
}

$ConfigText = Get-Content -Path $CfgFile -Raw
Remove-Item -Path $CfgFile -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue

$Match = $ConfigText -match "(?mi)^\s*SeCreatePermanentPrivilege\s*=\s*(.*)$"
$CurrentValue = ""
if ($Match) {
    $CurrentValue = $Matches[1].Trim()
}

$Expected = ""
if ($CurrentValue -eq $Expected) {
    Write-Output "Compliant"
    exit 0
} else {
    Write-Output "Non-Compliant"
    exit 1
}

Sources & Compliance References

  • ANSSI Active Directory Hardening Guide: ANSSI Active Directory Hardening Guide: R28 (User Rights Assignment)
  • CIS Benchmark: 2.2.9 (L1) Ensure 'Create permanent shared objects' is set to 'No One'
  • Microsoft Security Baseline: User Rights Configuration specifications
  • Microsoft Learn: User Rights Assignment Reference

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